I. Introduction
For many firms, trade receivables are an important part of their assets. This raises the question why firms extend credit to their customers. It has been argued that trade credit is used to reduce the transaction costs of paying bills (Schwartz, 1974; Ferris, 1981) , to smooth demand and price discriminate (Emery, 1987; Brennan et al., 1988) , or to allow customers to assess product quality before paying (e.g. Smith, 1987; Lee and Stowe, 1993; Bastos and Pindado, 2007) . Finance based trade credit models argue that suppliers have significant cost advantages over financial institutions in providing credit to their customers (e.g. Schwartz, 1974 , Emery, 1984 Biais and Gollier, 1997) . Furthermore, suppliers desiring to maintain a long-term relationship with customers may grant more concessions to a customer who is in need for extra liquidity than would be granted lenders in a competitive credit market (Wilner, 2000; Cuñat, 2007) . In countries where formal financial institutions are underdeveloped, trade credit may be an important informal financial institution (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001; Fisman and Love, 2003; Cull et al., 2007) : firms with better access to credit channel short-term funds from financial institutions via trade credit to financially weaker firms.
In this paper, we go back to the start of the 20 th century to test the hypothesis that bank-affiliated firms with better access to credit redistributed funds via trade credit to financially weaker customers. Belgium before World War I provides a particularly interesting environment to test this hypothesis. Investors were poorly protected and faced severe information problems (Théate, 1905) , while the banking sector was strongly developed (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 2003) . A limited F o r P e e r R e v i e w -3 -number of universal banks offered a wide range of services to firms (e.g. Durviaux, 1947; Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, 1991) , and many Belgian firms had close ties with these banks (Van Overfelt et al., 2009) . We investigate the determinants of trade credit granted by suppliers to their customers. Our findings, based a sample of 535 firm-year observations for 125 listed firms in the coalmining, tramways, railways and textile industries in the period 1905-1909, generally confirm the financing role of trade credit. We find that firms in which a bank had an equity stake redistributed capital via trade credit to other firms.
However, firms with a banker on their board but without a bank equity stake did not provide more credit to their customers. Older firms and firms with higher cash flows also provided more trade credit. Consistent with findings for contemporary developing countries, our results suggest that a century ago, trade credit was a tool for channelling funds from firms with close bank ties to other firms. As such, our study provides a unique contribution to the literature.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the financing role of trade credit, while section 3 focuses on trade credit and bank relationships in pre-World War I Belgium. The sample and the construction of the variables is discusses in section 4. Regression results are presented in section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
II. The financing role of trade credit
Finance based trade credit models argue that suppliers have significant cost advantages over financial institutions in providing credit to their customers. Petersen and Rajan (1997) need for extra liquidity than would be granted lenders in a competitive credit market. Suppliers know that they may have to help customers in financial distress, so they will charge them a higher trade credit interest rate as compensation for providing insurance against liquidity shocks (Wilner, 2000; Cuñat, 2007) . Trade creditors may also alleviate the problems of bank information monopolies: when the bank raises the interest rate to extract a rent, the borrowing firm can substitute bank debt by trade debt (Tsuruta, 2008) . Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Marotta, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001; Nilsen, 2002) . These firms will act as "agents" for the financial institutions, channelling short-term funds from the financial institutions to their best use. Consistent with this view, Love et al. (2007) find that after the emerging markets financial crises of the 1990s, firms with more vulnerable financial positions were more likely to reduce their supply of credit to customers. Cull et al. (2007) Cameron, 1967; Carosso, 1970; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Fohlin, 2006) .
The most prominent of these banks in Belgium were universal banks, which offered a wide range of services to firms: they took equity stakes, provided loans, assisted firms in the issuance of securities and were often involved in the management of affiliated firms (e.g. Durviaux, 1947; Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, 1991) .
These banks had close ties with many Belgian firms, either as a shareholder or through interlocking directorships (Van Overfelt et al., 2009) . Firms with close bank ties are likely to face less credit constraints than firms without bank ties.
Enhanced monitoring by the universal bank through close and continued interactions with the firm increases available credit for the firm. Delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary has lower monitoring costs than monitoring by a group of individual borrowers, and it avoids the free rider problem (Diamond, 1984) . The Belgian universal banks indeed played an active role in the companies they controlled (Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, 1997). Carosso, 1970; De Long, 1991; Ramirez, 1995; Franks, Mayer and Wagner, 2006) . A bank with access to more timely information and with incentives to produce more durable information can better certify offer prices in securities issues. The findings of Deloof et al. (2007) that in the period considered in this study, Belgian firms with a banker on their board paid higher and more stable dividends than firms without bank relationships is consistent with the "certification" role of bank directors.
A number of studies find that relationships with financial institutions indeed reduce credit constraints (see Ongena and Smith, 2000 , for a review). Some of these studies focus on the early 20 th century. Ramirez (1995) finds that firms affiliated with J. P. Morgan were less liquidity constrained, while the results of Becht and Ramirez (2003) suggest that coal-mining firms affiliated with a universal bank in Germany also faced less credit constraints. DeLong (2001) shows that the presence of directors affiliated with J.P. Morgan was associated with higher firm value. Van Overfelt et al. (2009) In our empirical analysis we will assume a bank relationship (i) if a bank has a direct equity stake in the firm, and/or (ii) if the firm has a bank director on its board. Firms with a bank equity stake are likely to have a close relationship with the bank. A relationship at the board level represents a continuous interaction and information exchange between the firm and the bank and may facilitate access to bank credit, even in the absence of a bank equity stake. We expect that firms with bank relationships extended more credit to their customers. We will also consider the financing role of trade credit by using firm size and firm age as proxies for access to external financing (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1997) .
Larger and older firms may grant more trade credit to customers because wellestablished firms have better access to external financing. It can also be expected that firms with more internal cash are able to extend more credit to their customers (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1996) . We therefore expect a positive relationship between cash flow and trade credit granted.
Product quality explanations of trade credit on the other hand predict that larger and older firms will extend less trade credit to their customers than smaller and younger firms, because they have more established reputations: firms with established reputations need not use additional quality signals (e.g. Long et al., 1993; Lee and Stowe, 1993) .
IV. Sample and Variables

Sample
Our sample consists of Belgian firms listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange in the period 1905-1909. We focus on four major industries: coal-mining, tramways, railways and textiles. At the time, these were the four largest Belgian industries in terms of (i) the number of firms in the industry and (ii) the number of firms affiliated with a universal bank. We hand-collected financial statement data from the appendices to the Official Gazette ("Annexes au Moniteur Belge: Recueil Spécial des Actes des Sociétés"). This is the most reliable source of Belgian financial statement data for that period. All firms constituted under Belgian (Théate, 1905) .
Since the discretionary power of management to design the financial statement was high, there is substantial heterogeneity in the structure of the financial statements. Therefore we had to reformat the financial statements in a uniform structure. Fortunately, the law provided some guidelines about the depreciation of assets and the distribution of profits (Resteau, 1913a and 1913b) and we were able to check practitioners' guides to get a better understanding of the accounting principles at the turn of the century (François, 1902 and 1907) .
After removing some observations with missing or outlying values for the variables considered in the empirical analysis, our sample consists of 535 firmyear observations for 125 different firms.
Variables
Our measure of trade credit is accounts receivable scaled by total assets 1 . As for bank relationships, we consider relationships with six different banks: (i) the Société Générale; (ii) the Crédit Général Liégeois; (iii) the Banque d'Outremer;
(iv) the Banque Liégeoise; (v) the Banque de Bruxelles and (vi) the Banque Internationale de Bruxelles. These were the most important listed universal banks both in terms of total assets and the value of the industrial portfolio (Durviaux, 1947 ; see also Van Overfelt et al., 2009) . The data on the bank equity stakes were collected from the "Recueil Financier", which listed the industrial portfolio of the 1 Accounts receivable are scaled by total assets instead of sales because the financial statements generally did not show sales. We do not consider accounts payable because financial statements in pre-World War I Belgium did not distinguish between trade liabilities and bank debt. Table 1 shows the number of firms interlocked with each universal bank. 43 of the 125 firms in our sample were interlocked with a universal bank. Almost half of these firms were interlocked with either the Société Générale or the Crédit Général Liégois. The table also shows the number of equity stakes held by each universal bank. Most of these stakes were held by the Société Générale; the other banks had very few or no equity stakes. All the firms in which a bank had an equity stake were also interlocked with that bank.
As for the other explanatory variables, Ln(size) is the natural logarithm of total assets; and ln(age) is the natural logarithm of difference between the current year and the year the firm transformed to a limited liability company. Cash flow is operating profit plus depreciation over the fiscal year, scaled by the book value of total assets.
The financial statements of the firms considered in this study distinguish between two forms of debt: "obligations" or bonds, and "créditeurs", which is all other debt. "Créditeurs" could be bank debt but also trade liabilities. We include both Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Deloof and Jegers, 1999) . Maturity matching suggests a positive relationship between accounts receivable and other debt, and a negative relationship between accounts receivable and bonds. To capture industry-specific trade credit policies, we also consider dummies for the coal-mining, tramways, and textiles industries. Table 2 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. Investments in accounts receivable were substantial: on average 20.1% of total assets (median is 14.0%). However, Table 3 shows that there were large differences across industries. While accounts receivable were on average more than 20% of total assets for coal-mining and textile firms, they constituted less than 10% of total assets for tramways and railways firms. Our sample reflects the importance of the coal-mining industry at the turn of the 20 th century: a majority of the firm-year observations (341) in our sample are observations for the coal-mining industry. (Petersen, 2009 ).
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V. Regression results
In regression (1) we include a bank equity stake dummy as a measure of bank relationships. The coefficient of this variable, which is statistically significant at the 10% level, implies that the ratio of accounts receivable to total assets is 8.8%
higher for firms with a bank equity stake than for firms without a bank equity stake. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that bank affiliated firms with better access to credit redistributed capital via trade credit to other firms.
Finance based models of trade credit predict that larger and older firms with better access to credit will extend more credit than smaller and younger firms. Product quality models on the other hand assume that larger and older firms extend less credit, because firms with established reputations need not use trade credit as a quality signal. In regression (1), the ln(size) coefficient is insignificant, while the ln(age) coefficient is positive and significant at the 10% level, which is consistent with the financing hypothesis, but inconsistent with the product quality hypothesis. We also find that cash flow is positively and significantly (at the 1% level) related to accounts receivable, confirming that firms with more internal cash were able to grant more credit to their customers.
Consistent with the maturity matching hypothesis, we find that accounts receivable are positively and significantly (at the 5% level) related to "other debt".
Finally, our results suggest that coal-mining firms extended more trade credit than In regression (2) we consider our second measure of bank relationships: a dummy which equals one if a firm had a bank director on its board, and zero otherwise.
However, the coefficient of this variable is insignificant.
Firms in trouble may extend trade credit to attempt to maintain their sales (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Marotta, 2005) . We test this conjecture by separating cash flow into cash flow if positive and cash flow if negative: firms with a negative cash flow are more likely to be in trouble than firms with a positive cash flow. In regression (3), the coefficient of former remains positive and significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient of the latter is insignificant. The conjecture that firms in trouble extended more trade credit is therefore not confirmed.
Most of the sample firms in which a bank has an equity stake are coal-mining firms. It is therefore possible that the effect of bank equity stakes we found in regression (1) is in fact a proxy for a "coal-mining effect": maybe it was not firms with a bank equity stake but firms in the coal-mining industry which extended more trade credit. In regression (4) we re-estimated our base model for coalmining firms only (341 firm-year observations). The bank equity coefficient is again economically large (0.147), and statistically significant at the 5% level. This result suggests that even within the coal mining industry firms with a bank equity stake extended more trade credit. The findings for the other independent variables are also confirmed: ln(age), cash flow and other debt are all significant when we consider coal-mining firms only. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 This raises the question which customers were granted more credit by bank affiliated firms. It cannot be ruled out that affiliated firms extended more credit only to firms controlled by the same bank. As a matter of fact, Deloof and Jegers (1996) find evidence that Belgian firms belonging to a group in the 1990s used Ln(size) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Ln(age) is the natural logarithm of difference between the current year and the year the firm transformed to a limited liability company. All regressions include year dummies. P-values (robust for heteroscedasticity) are in parentheses below each coefficient. P-values for random effects estimations are based on clustered standard errors. ***: denotes significance at the 1% level; **: denotes significance at the 5% level; *: denotes significance at the 10% level.
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